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The Current State of Workers’
Compensation
Benefit Adequacy, Return to Work, and Prevention
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Various plan-design
elements have emerged
that seem to provide better
adequacy of workers’
compensation benefits
than the medical-based
impairment and gross earnings
replacement approach.
n Disability management
techniques appear to have the
capacity to significantly reduce
the burden of work-related
disability for both workers and
employers in our workplaces.
n Workers’ compensation
programs have tools available
to improve employer safety
and prevention performance.
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Marcus Dillender and H. Allan Hunt
Workers’ compensation programs are statelevel insurance programs that provide medical
care and income replacement benefits for people
injured at work. Although states’ rules differ
along various dimensions, each state other than
Texas has statutes that require employers to
provide insurance with specified benefits. Since
each workers’ compensation program is unique,
comparisons across programs can be complicated
or impossible. Moreover, data on occupational
injuries, compensation, safety, and accommodation
practices at firms are typically unavailable. When
data are available, they can be suspect and suffer
from the disadvantage that they often come from
a single jurisdiction. Also, since different data and
methods are used across studies, results can be
difficult to compare across studies and to generalize
to other workers’ compensation systems. The result
is a rather sparse and dubious-quality research
literature.
In our new book, Workers’ Compensation:
Analysis for Its Second Century (see p. 7), we
discuss and analyze the status of state workers’
compensation programs along the three
dimensions of benefit adequacy, return to work,
and prevention incentives using the research record
that has been compiled to date. We highlight the
often-contrasting incentives that firms, workers,
and insurers face as they operate within these
programs. We consider recent trends in workers’
compensation, discuss innovations that have yet to
be evaluated, and try to draw conclusions from the
research whenever possible and point to gaps in
our knowledge that future research should address.
Benefit Adequacy
The chapter on benefit adequacy reviews recent
studies of workers’ compensation in Canada
and Michigan. Michigan is unique because,

unlike other states, it does not have a statutory
designation of permanent partial disability. And as
a “wage-loss” state, Michigan law provides that lost
earnings benefits shall be paid for the duration of
the disability, with a few exceptions. This contrasts
with other states with an “impairment” orientation,
where a medical assessment of the degree of
disability is made and benefit payments are
derived from that rating. Furthermore, there is no
designation of the level of disability in Michigan,
so there is no impairment rating available, only a
record of the payments made. Canadian workers’
compensation systems are similar to those in the
United States except that all workers’ compensation
insurance is with public entities, benefits are
typically more generous, and waiting periods are
shorter or nonexistent.
A study from the Workers Compensation
Research Institute finds that the Michigan workers’
compensation system provides more adequate
benefits than many other state systems (Savych and
Hunt 2017). Figure 1 charts workers’ compensation
benefits and postinjury earnings for workers with
more than one month of lost work time or a lumpsum settlement compared to earnings of similar
workers with injuries that did not qualify for wage
replacement benefits. There is a marked drop in
earnings after the injury and a decline in earnings
that lasts at least five years, but the addition of
workers’ compensation benefits brings the earnings
replacement rate to 97 percent at 5 years and 88
percent when projected out to 10 years.
This performance appears to be largely due
to the wage-loss orientation and the “spendable
earnings” wage replacement formula used in
Michigan. Taking account of income taxes,
payroll taxes, and family size clearly provides the
opportunity for tailoring wage-loss replacement
more closely to apparent need across all workers.
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So, despite a lower maximum benefit
in Michigan, set at 90 percent of the
state average weekly wage versus 100
percent in most U.S. jurisdictions,
workers’ compensation wage-loss
benefits in Michigan look pretty good.
But if benefits in Michigan appear to be
higher than those in some other states,
they are clearly not as generous as in
the Canadian systems that have been
subjected to similar wage-loss studies.
Return to Work
While ensuring adequate
compensation is a basic legislated
priority of workers’ compensation,
returning injured workers to
employment swiftly and safely lowers
compensation costs for employers and
helps workers by raising their incomes
and by serving as part of their physical
and emotional recovery from an injury.
In our chapter on return to work,
we discuss disability management

techniques designed to improve returnto-work performance that include
maintaining close contact with the
injured worker, improving medical
management, and accommodating
limitations at work.
Disability management’s promise
for improving the return-to-work
performance of workers’ compensation
systems is reflected in the proliferation
of state policy innovations that directly
or indirectly support or encourage
these interventions. Credible evidence
on the impact of return-to-work
programs is sparse but promising.
Reductions of up to 40 percent in
disability duration have been reported
among large self-insured firms
(McLaren, Reville, and Seabury 2010),
and several review articles have found
strong empirical support for the effects
of disability management techniques.
The widespread adoption of
such techniques among private

Figure 1 Average Quarterly Earnings, Workers’ Compensation Income Replacement Benefits,
and Reweighted Comparison Earnings, by Quarter from Injury, Injuries in Michigan in 2004
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employers throughout the 1990s also
demonstrates their efficacy. Figure 2
shows how the balance has shifted from
injuries with days away from work
to those with restricted activity only.
This serves as evidence of the spread
of disability management techniques.
We conclude that properly motivated
disability management techniques can
remove many barriers to return-towork for workers with impairments,
which reduces both workers’
compensation costs for employers and
lost wages for workers.
Prevention
As the need for income benefits
and return-to-work considerations
can both be avoided if injuries are
prevented in the first place, we also
discuss how workers’ compensation
insurance can affect both workers’
and firms’ prevention efforts. As can
be seen in Figure 3, average wage
loss benefits and average medical
benefits have both fallen since the early
1990s as occupational injury rates
have dropped, but wage loss benefits
have fallen much more dramatically
than medical benefits. The increased
medical benefits as a percentage of
all workers’ compensation benefits
makes the need for prevention efforts
an important component of cost
containment considerations regardless
of a state’s benefit adequacy.
In the chapter on prevention, we
discuss how workers’ compensation
alters both firms’ and workers’ inherent
incentives to prevent occupational
injuries and diseases. For workers,
more adequate compensation benefits
reduce the costs of injuries, which
lower their incentives to avoid injury.
For firms with experience-rated
premiums, higher claim costs increase
future premiums, meaning that
experience rating gives firms a financial
incentive to improve safety. Empirical
work has devoted considerable
attention to trying to understand
which of these conflicting effects
dominates, but it is often stymied by
the simultaneous effect of workers’
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Conclusions
Given the current state of
knowledge, we believe that workers’
compensation programs could be
improved along several dimensions.
However, there seems to be a
reluctance to consider improvements
under the existing political
environment. More research is needed
on various workers’ compensation
issues, but we also believe that there
are reasons for optimism about the
three performance dimensions that
we consider. With benefit adequacy,
various plan-design elements have
emerged that seem to provide better
adequacy of workers’ compensation
benefits than the medical-based
impairment and gross earnings
replacement approach. With return
to work, disability management
techniques appear to have the
capacity to significantly reduce the
burden of work-related disability for
both workers and employers in our
workplaces. With prevention, workers’
compensation programs appear to have
tools available to improve employer
safety and prevention performance.

Figure 2 National Trends in Rates Associated with Lost Workdays
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Figure 3 Workers’ Compensation Medical and Cash Benefits per $100 of Covered Wages,
1980–2012
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compensation benefits on reporting
incentives conditional on the number
of true injuries at a firm. When benefits
are higher, workers have an increased
incentive to report injuries, while firms
have incentives to suppress reporting
of injuries.
Although much existing empirical
evidence points to a positive
relationship between frequency of
injuries and the level of workers’
compensation benefits (e.g., Krueger
1990; Ruser 1985), we feel the evidence
is not persuasive that better workers’
compensation benefits actually
encourage workers to act more
recklessly. However, making workers’
compensation premiums more
accurately reflect the previous claims
history of individual employers appears
to improve employers’ safety and
prevention efforts, as well as encourage
employers to devote more attention to
the worker’s successful return to work.

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

1.00

0.80
Cash

0.60

0.40

Medical

0.20

0.00

SOURCE: Estimates from the National Academy of Social Insurance.

3

EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH • JULY 2017

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

Workers’ Compensation:
Analysis for Its Second Century

Count us among those who believe
that today’s workers’ compensation
programs have the potential to serve
for another 100 years, but they will
require significant improvement. We
call upon legislative bodies to address
current shortcomings, and we call
upon the research community to
provide appropriate guidance for these
efforts.
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Regulating Access to Work
in the Gig Labor Market
The Case of Uber
Morris M. Kleiner
U.S. labor markets traditionally
have included long-term employment
relationships that last many years
or decades. They also have been
characterized by internal labor
markets, unions, and a web of rules
that, often by law, both employers and
workers are required to observe. New
innovations and technologies, such as
smart phones and their accompanying
apps, have allowed labor markets to
become more fluid and responsive
to spot market supply and demand
conditions. They have allowed workers
more flexibility in their choice of hours
worked, and have allowed consumers
to better evaluate the quality of
services. As a result, gig labor markets,
which let workers easily book jobs by
the hour or project, have grown and
flourished. The number of workers
directly working through apps now
comprise nearly 1 percent of the total
workforce, making gig labor markets
one of the fastest growing areas in the
labor force (Katz and Krueger 2016;
Torpey and Hogan 2016).
Workers who have entered the
gig labor market have few of the
government regulations or web of
rules that govern traditional labor
markets. In addition, labor laws such as
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
National Labor Relations Act usually
do not apply to these workers (Harris

and Krueger 2015). Yet one area of
labor market regulation, occupational
licensing, is pervasive, and in this
article, I examine the interaction of this
institution in one large company that
operates largely in the gig economy.
The Uber Innovation
The ride-sharing firm Uber
has come to exemplify the recent
technology “revolution” and labor
market outcomes embodied in the
gig economy. It had 84–87 percent
of the total ride-sharing trips (i.e.,
cab-substitute markets) in 2016 and
is currently active in 450 cities in
the United States and worldwide.1
Uber began offering its first rides in
2010 in San Francisco and in New
York City in 2011 as a way to match
individuals who needed rides to work
or recreation with those individuals
who were willing to provide those rides
for a price. The creation of an app and
accompanying software allowed this
matching process to be done in an
efficient and profitable manner for the
company (Roth and Ockenfels 2002).
Uber takes a percentage of the ride
price for the company as their fee for
matching the drivers and riders. The
drivers anticipate an ample supply of
customers, and the waiting times for
drivers in traditional cabs were reduced
and revenues enhanced for those
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Download this WEfocus book for free at
research.upjohn.org/up_press/244/.

n The number of workers directly working through apps now comprise nearly 1 percent of the total workforce, making gig labor markets one of the fastest growing areas
in the labor force.

Marcus Dillender is senior economist and H. Allan
Hunt is senior economist emeritus, both at the Upjohn
Institute.

n Evidence from a quasi-experiment in New York and New Jersey suggests that
there are few gains from occupational licensing of ride-sharing providers as assessed
through customer satisfaction or measures of customer safety.

